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1 Parallel Inference Machine
Универсальный русско-английский словарь > Parallel Inference Machine
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2 PIM
parallel inference machine — «параллельная машина логического вывода», архитектура PIM PIM -
3 параллельный вывод
1) Information technology: parallel output (данных)2) Programming: parallel inference (напр. машина параллельного вывода)Универсальный русско-английский словарь > параллельный вывод
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4 машина параллельного вывода
Computers: parallel inference machineУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > машина параллельного вывода
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5 Bibliography
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6 ita
ita adv. [2 I-]. I. In gen., referring to what precedes, in this manner, in this wise, in such a way, so, thus, accordingly, as has been said: des operam ut investiges sitne ita: Ita aiunt, T.: his rebus ita actis, S.: factum est ita: ita digerit omina Calchas, such is his interpretation, V.: quae cum ita sint, and since this is so, and accordingly: quod cum ita sit.—Referring to what follows, thus, in the following manner, as follows, in this way: ita censes; publicandas pecunias, etc., S.: is ita cum Caesare egit; si, etc., Cs.: ita constitui, fortiter esse agendum.—In affirmation, yes, it is so, just so, true: quid istic tibi negotist? Dav. mihin'? Si. Ita, T.: an laudationes? ita, inquit Antonius: Davusne? ita, H.: itast, T.: non est ita: ita prorsus: ita plane.—In interrogations, expecting an affirmative answer: itane? really? truly? is it so?: Itan credis? T.: itane est?: itane tandem?—In the phrase, quid ita? implying reproach or surprise, why so? how is that? what do you mean?: accusatis Sex. Roscium. quid ita?: quid ita passus est Eretriam capi? L.— II. Esp., in comparisons, so, thus, just, in the same way: ita ut res sese habet, T.: ita vero, Quirites, ut precamini, eveniat: ut homo est, ita morem geras, T.: ita loquor, quasi ego fecerim, etc.: me consulem ita fecistis, quo modo pauci facti sunt: castra ita posita, tamquam procul abesset hostis, L.—Correl. with ut, in parallel clauses: in pace ita ut in bello, alike in peace, etc., S.: ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat, his own, as well as, etc.—In oaths or emphatic wishes, so, if it be true: Ita me di ament, non nil timeo, i. e. so help me, T.: sollicitat, ita vivam, me tua valetudo: ita me referat tibi Iuppiter, V.: tecum esse, ita mihi omnia quae opto contingant, ut vehementer velim.— III. Praegn., of kind or quality, so, such, of this nature, of this kind: ita sunt res nostrae: ita inquam (i. e. hoc dico).—Of a natural consequence or inference, so, thus, accordingly, under these circumstances, in this manner, therefore: ita sine periculo, etc., Cs.: ita praetorium missum, L.: ita Iovis illud sacerdotium per hanc rationem Theomnasto datur: ita fit ut animus iudicet, etc., thus it comes to pass: ita fit ut deus ille nusquam prorsus appareat, hence it follows.—In restriction, on the condition, on the assumption, in so far, to such an extent, only in so far: haec ita administrabat, ut, etc., Cs.: cuius ingenium ita laudo, ut non pertimescam: pax ita convenerat, ut Etruscis Latinisque fluvius finis esset, L.: ita admissi captivi, ne tamen iis senatus daretur, L.—Of degree, so, to such a degree, so very, so much: ita fugavit Samnites, ut, etc., L.: iudices ita fortes tamen fuerunt, ut... vel perire maluerint, quam, etc.: ita acriter... itaque repente, Cs. —With negatives, not very, not especially: non ita magnus numerus, Cs.: non ita lato interiecto mari: accessione utuntur non ita probabili: post, neque ita multo, N.* * *thus, so; therefore -
7 τε
τε, enclitic Particle, with two main uses (v. infr. A, B).A as a Conjunction,I τε.. τε, both.. and, joining single words, phrases, clauses, or sentences, the first τε merely pointing forward to the second,ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε Il.1.544
;ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε Hes.Op. 669
;δίψῃ τε λιμῷ τε A.Pers. 491
, cf. S.Aj.34,35, Ar.Ach. 370, 375;τήν τε νῆσον τήν τε ἤπειρον Th.4.8
, cf. Antipho 2.3.3, Pl. R. 373b;λυσόμενός τε θύγατρα, φέρων τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα Il.1.13
; παῖδά τε σοὶ ἀγέμεν Φοίβῳ θ' ἱερὴν ἑκατόμβην ῥέξαι ib. 443; the elements joined by τε.. τε are usu. short in Hom., longer in later Gr., e.g.ἐπειδὴ πρόξενοί τέ εἰσιν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εὐεργέται.., ἔν τε τῇ στήλῃ γέγραπται IG12.103.7
;ἥ τε γὰρ γῆ.. εὔυδρός ἐστι, ποταμοί τε δι' αὐτῆς ῥέουσι Hdt.4.47
; χρὴ.. τούς τε πρεσβυτέρους ὁμοιωθῆναι τοῖς πρὶν ἔργοις, τούς τε νεωτέρους.. μὴ αἰσχῦναι κτλ. Th.4.92, cf. Pl.R. 474c, X.Cyr.1.4.25, Is.1.50; τά τε γὰρ ληφθέντα πάντ' ἂν σῴζοιτο οἵ τ' ἀδικήσαντες κατ' ἀξίαν λάβοιεν τὰ ἐπιτίμια Aen. Tact.16.8, cf. Gp.2.49.1, 12.3.2-3;τούτου γὰρ γενομένου.. τά τε ἐχφόρια Χρυσέρμῳ δυνήσομαι ἀποδοῦναι, ἐγώ τε ἔσομαι παρὰ σοῦ φιλανθρωπίας τετευχώς PEnteux.60.11
(iii B.C.);κλείειν τε τὰ βλέφαρα δεομένων ἐλπιζόντων τε κοιμηθήσεσθαι Gal.16.494
, cf. 495,501; this use is common at all times in οὔτε.. οὔτε, μήτε.. μήτε, εἴτε.. εἴτε (qq.v.); τε may be used three or more times,ἔν τ' ἄρα οἱ φῦ χειρί, ἔπος τ' ἔφατ' ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζεν Od.15.530
, cf. Il.1.177, 2.58, A.Pr. 89sq., B.17.19sq., Lys. 19.17, X.Cyr.3.3.36:— ἑνδεκάτη τε δυωδεκάτη τε prob. means the eleventh or twelfth, Od.2.374, 4.588:—sts. τε.. τε couples alternatives, , cf. Heracl. 153, El. 391; hence we find τε.. ἢ.., Pl.Tht. 143c, Ion 535d; on ἢ (or ἦ) .. τε in Il.2.289 and A.Eu. 524 (lyr.) v. ἦ 1.3.2 the first clause may be negative, the second affirmative, asἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει.., τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε Th.2.22
; but οὔτε.. τε is more freq., asοὔτε ποσίν εἰμι ταχύς.., γιγνώσκω τε X.Cyr.2.3.6
(v.οὔτε 11.4
); we also find οὐ.. τε.. , asοὐχ ἡσύχαζον.., παρεκάλουν τε τοὺς ξυμμάχους Th.1.67
; and μὴ.. τε.. , as ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει κτλ. Pl.Phd. 95e.a τε.. δὲ.. , asκόμισαί τέ με, δὸς δέ μοι ἵππους Il.5.359
, cf. 7.418, S.OC 367, Tr. 285, E.Ph. 1625;ἐσθὰς ἀμφότερόν νιν ἔχεν, ἅ τε.. ἐπιχώριος.., ἀμφὶ δὲ παρδαλέᾳ στέγετο Pi.P.4.80
;διήκουέ τε.., ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐπῄνεσε X.Cyr.4.4.3
; so with ἅμα δὲ καὶ.., ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ.., Th.1.25, Pl.Smp. 186e:—so τε.., ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ.., Id.Hp.Ma. 295e.bμὲν.. τε.., ἄνδρα μὲν.., τρεῖς τε κασιγνήτους Il.19.291
-3, cf. Od.22.475-6, Pi.O.6.88, 7.88, A.Th. 924, Ch. 585 (lyr.), S.Ant. 963 (lyr.), E.Heracl. 337 codd., Cyc.41 (lyr.), Ar.Nu. 563(lyr.), Pl.Phdr. 266c, Lg. 927b: v. μέν A. 11.6c.4 a single τε ( and) joins a word, phrase, or (esp. later) clause or sentence to what precedes,τελευτὴν κεφαλήν τε Pl.Ti. 69a
; θνητὰ ἀθάνατά τε ib.c;Ζεῦ ἄλλοι τε θεοί Il.6.476
; ; ῥίγησέν τ' ἂρ ἔπειτα ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων v.l. for δ' ἂρ in 11.254; ἕν τε οὐδὲν κατέστη ἴαμα.., σῶμά τε αὔταρκες ὂν οὐδὲν διεφάνη.., Th.2.51; τά τε ἱερὰ.. νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν.. ib.52; νόμοι τε πάντες ξυνεταράχθησαν ibid.; , cf. 253, 262, al.;εἴς τε τὰς ἄλλας.. ἀθροίζεσθαι Aen.Tact.3.5
; τῶν τε ἀρχόντων.. ib.6, cf. 10.8, al.;ὅ τε γραφεὶς κύκλος.. Archim.Spir.11
Def.7;πρός τε τούτοις φησὶν.. PEnteux.63.18
(iii B.C.);χωρίς τε τούτων Plb.2.56.13
, 61.1, 3.17.7;ταῦτά τ' ἐγίνετο.. Id.2.43.6
, cf. 3.70.4;ἀπαιτούμενός τε ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τὰ ἔρια οὐκ ἀποδίδωσί PEnteux.2.6
, cf. 8.4, al. (iii B.C.); γράψαι Ἀγαθοκλεῖ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ διασαφῆσαί τε αὐτῷ ib.81.21 (iii B.C.);καθόλου τε.. Arr.Epict.1.19.13
, cf. 2.2.17; , cf. 24, al.;ὄξει βαφικῷ στυπτηρίᾳ τε PHolm. 1.4
, cf. Gem.16.6;χρὴ.. λαχάνων ἅπτεσθαι, κοιλίαν τε λύειν Gp.1.12.19
, cf. 2.2.2, al.; this τε may be used any number of times, Od.4.149- 150, 14.75, 158-9, Men.Pk.15,16,20, Hipparch.1.9.8, Act.Ap.2.43,46, 4.13, 14, al.II τε.. καὶ.. , or τε καὶ.. , both.. and.., where τε points forward to καί, and usu. need not be translated, e.g. ; εἰ δὴ ὁμοῦ πόλεμός τε δαμᾷ καὶ λοιμὸς Ἀχαιούς ib.61; δειλός τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καλεοίμην ib. 293;ζωόν τε καὶ ἀρτεμέα 7.308
, cf. 327, 338, al.;τῆς τε γῆς ἐούσης ἐπιτηδέης καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐόντων σφι συμμάχων Hdt.4.47
;βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐπίσταται Th.2.35
;ὁ φύς τε καὶ τραφείς Pl.R. 396c
;βάσιν τε γὰρ πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι τὴν ΖΒ καὶ.. Euc.1.47
; sts. the elements joined by τε.. καὶ.. are joined in order to be compared or contrasted rather than simply joined, ; ; ; ἐπαύσατό τε ὁ ἄνεμος καὶ τὸ κῦμα ἔστρωτο ib. 193;ταὐτὰ.. νῦν τε καὶ τότε Ar.Av. 24
; ; ; sts. (like τε.. τε) even used of alternatives,διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν, ἵππους τε στρέψαι καὶ ἐναντίβιον μαχέσασθαι Il.8.168
;ἐν δίκᾳ τε καὶ παρὰ δίκαν Pi.O.2.16
;θεοῦ τε.. θέλοντος καὶ μὴ θέλοντος A.Th. 427
;πείσας τε.. καὶ μὴ τυχών Th.3.42
:—on οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ.. , e.g.τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἅπασι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις Isoc.12.249
, and ἄλλως τε καὶ.. , v. ἄλλος 11.6,ἄλλως 1.3
.2 in this sense τ' ἠδέ is only [dialect] Ep.,σκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας Il.9.99
, cf. 1.400, al.; alsoτε.., ἰδέ, χαλκόν τε ἰδὲ λόφον 6.469
, cf. 8.162.3 καὶ.. τε, both.. and.., is occasionally found, as καὶ μητέρα πατέρα τ' E.Alc. 646.b καὶ.. τε perh. means and.. also inκαὶ ναυτικῷ τε ἅμα Th.1.9
;καὶ πρός τε τοὺς Ῥηγίνους Id.6.44
;καὶ αὐτός τε Id.8.68
; v. infr. c. 10.4 τε.. τε or τε.. καὶ.. sts. join elements which are not syntactically parallel, esp. a part. and a finite verb, ἰοῖσίν τε τιτυσκόμενοι λάεσσί τ' ἔβαλλον (for βάλλοντες) Il.3.80; ; ;τῆς τε ὥρας.. ταύτης οὔσης.., καὶ τὸ χωρίον.. χαλεπὸν ἦν Id.7.47
, cf. 4.85, 8.81, 95.5 the copulative τε becomes rare in later Gr.; it is found about 340 times in LXX, mostly in the Pentateuch and 1-4 Ma., only 3 times in Ps.; in the NT it is found about 150 times in Act.Ap., 20 times in Ep.Hebr., and very rarely in the other books.B In [dialect] Ep. (more rarely in other dactylic verse, v. infr. 11) τε stands in general or frequentative statements or in statements of what is well known; such statements are freq. made as justifications of a preceding particular statement or of a preceding exhortation to a particular person or persons; the sense of τε thus approaches that of τοι (cf. τοι and τε in Od.2.276-7, and cf. Il.13.115 with 15.203); although associated with numerous particles and other words of particular types (v. infr.) its meaning remains independent of these and applies to the whole sentence in which it stands: ; ;θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν 4.379
, cf. 5.79, 447, 10.306, 17.485, Il.9.497, 16.688, 17.176, 21.264; , cf. Od.11.537, Il.24.526;ἤ τ' ἔβλητ' ἤ τ' ἔβαλ' ἄλλον 11.410
;οὐ μὲν γάρ τε κακὸν βασιλευέμεν Od.1.392
;οἳ φύλλοισιν ἐοικότες ἄλλοτε μέν τε ζαφλεγέες τελέθουσιν.. ἄλλοτε δὲ.. Il.21.464
; , cf. 8.169, 170, 15.400; τοῦ γάρ τε ξεῖνος μιμνήσκεται ἤματα πάντα, ἀνδρὸς ξεινοδόκου, ὅς κεν φιλότητα παράσχῃ ib.54, cf. 17.322;ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω Il.17.32
;παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω Hes.Op. 218
;αἰεὶ γάρ τε νεώτεροι ἀφραδέουσιν Od. 7.294
; δύσζηλοι γάρ τ' εἰμὲν ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων ib. 307;τοῦ δέ τε πολλοὶ ἐπαυρίσκοντ' ἄνθρωποι, καί τε πολέας ἐσάωσε Il.13.733
-4; τοῦ μὲν γάρ τε κακοῦ τρέπεται χρὼς ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ, ἐν δέ τέ οἱ κραδίη στέρνοισι πατάσσει.., πάταγος δέ τε γίγνετ' ὀδόντων ib. 279-83; ;νέῳ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν.. κεῖσθαι 22.71
;κατέλεξεν ἅπαντα κήδε' ὅσ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλει, τῶν ἄστυ ἁλώῃ· ἄνδρας μὲν κτείνουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει, τέκνα δέ τ' ἄλλοι ἄγουσι, βαθυζώνους τε γυναῖκας 9.592
-4, cf. 22.492, 495, 499;νεμεσσῶμαί γε μὲν οὐδέν· καὶ γάρ τίς τ' ἀλλοῖον ὀδύρεται ἄνδρ' ὀλέσασα.. ἢ Ὀδυσῆ' Od.19.265
;σχέτλιε, καὶ μέν τίς τε χερείονι πείθεθ' ἑταίρῳ.., αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ θεός εἰμι 20.45
, cf. 23.118, Il.2.292, 9.632; νῦν δὲ μνησώμεθα δόρπου· καὶ γάρ τ' ἠΰκομος Νιόβη ἐμνήσατο σίτου κτλ. 24.602 (where a general inference is implied);ὃν Βριάρεων καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δέ τε πάντες Αἰγαίων' 1.403
, cf. 2.814, 5.306, 10.258, 14.290; sts. of repeated action by particular persons,ἄλλοτε μέν τε γόῳ φρένα τέρπομαι Od.4.102
;οὐ μὰ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνα Διὶ φίλον, ᾧ τε σύ, Κάλχαν, εὐχόμενος.. θεοπροπίας ἀναφαίνεις Il.1.86
; ἡ δὲ.. μ' αἰεὶ.. νεικεῖ, καί τέ μέ φησι μάχῃ Τρώεσσιν ἀρήγειν ib. 521;μήτηρ γάρ τέ μέ φησι θεά, Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα, διχθαδίας κῆρας φερέμεν θανάτοιο τέλοσδε 9.410
.2 in exhortations addressed to an individual, a subsidiary sentence or relative clause in which he is reminded of his special or characteristic sphere of activity is marked by τε, e.g.Ἑρμεία, σοὶ γάρ τε μάλιστά γε φίλτατόν ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ ἑταιρίσσαι καί τ' ἔκλυες ᾧ κ' ἐθέλῃσθα, βάσκ' ἴθι.. Il.24.334
;Ἀτρεΐδη, σοὶ γάρ τε μάλιστά γε λαὸς Ἀχαιῶν πείσονται μύθοισι.., νῦν δ' ἀπὸ πυρκαϊῆς σκέδασον.. 23.156
;δεῦρο δὴ ὄρσο, γρηῢ.., ἥ τε γυναικῶν δμῳάων σκοπός ἐσσι.., ἔρχεο Od. 22.395
, cf. Il.17.249.3 similarly in general and frequentative statements consisting of two clauses (one of which may be a relative clause, freq. containing the subj. or opt.), in which the fulfilment of the condition stated in the subsidiary or subordinate clause is declared to be generally or always followed by the result stated in the principal clause, either or both clauses may contain τε:a the principal clause alone contains τε, ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθηται, μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ Il.1.218
;ὃς δ' ἂν ἀμύμων αὐτὸς ἔῃ καὶ ἀμύμονα εἰδῇ, τοῦ μέν τε κλέος εὐρὺ διὰ ξεῖνοι φορέουσι πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, πολλοί τέ μιν ἐσθλὸν ἔειπον Od.19.333
;εἴ περ γὰρ θυμῷ γε μενοινάᾳ πολεμίζειν, ἀλλά τε λάθρῃ γυῖα βαρύνεται.., βλάβεται δέ τε γούνατ' ἰόντι Il.19.165
-6;ᾧ μέν κ' ἀμμείξας δώῃ Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος, ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλῷ 24.530
.b the subordinate clause alone contains τε, λάζετο δ' ἔγχος.. τῷ δάμνησι στίχας ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων οἷσίν τε κοτέσσεται ὀβριμοπάτρη 5.747
;ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίγνωτος γόνος ἀνέρος ᾧ τε Κρονίων ὄλβον ἐπικλώση Od.4.207
;ἀντί νυ πολλῶν λαῶν ἐστιν ἀνὴρ ὅν τε Ζεὺς κῆρι φιλήσῃ Il.9.117
, cf. 7.298, Od.6.287, 7.74, 8.547, 18.276; with opt.,ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρώτιστος.. ἕλεσκον ἀνδρῶν δυσμενέων ὅ τέ μοι εἴξειε πόδεσσι 14.221
: it is prob. that τε has been replaced by κε in the text of Hom. in Il.1.218, 9.510 (cf. 508), and some other passages in which κε seems to be used, exceptionally, in general relative clauses.c both clauses contain τε, ὃς μέν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς ἆσσον ἰούσας, τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καί τ' ἔκλυον εὐχομένοιο Il.9.508
-9;εἴ περ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ, ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον 1.82
-3.4 in the subordinate clause of a collective sentence, in which the principal clause states something to be true of all those (i.e. each individual) to whom the predicate of the subordinate clause applies,ὑπόσχωμαι.. κτήματα.. πάντα μάλ' ὅσσα τ' Ἀλέξανδρος.. ἠγάγετο Τροίηνδ'.. δωσέμεν Il.22.115
; , cf. Od.18.131, Il.19.105; , cf. 18.485.5 in relative clauses (and in parenthetic principal clauses) which indicate what is customary, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἱερήϊον οὐδὲ βοείην ἀρνύσθην, ἅ τε ποσσὶν ἀέθλια γίγνεται ἀνδρῶν which are the usual prizes.., Il.22.160;ἔργ' ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, τά τε κλείουσιν ἀοιδοί Od.1.338
, cf. 3.435, 4.85, 13.410, 14.226, 17.423, Il.5.332;κύματος ἐξαναδύς, τά τ' ἐρεύγεται ἤπειρόνδε Od.5.438
;μολπή τ' ὀρχηστύς τε, τὰ γάρ τ' ἀναθήματα δαιτός 1.152
: similarly in clauses withοἷά τε (πολλά), κῆτος ἐπισσεύῃ μέγα δαίμων ἐξ ἁλός, οἷά τε πολλὰ τρέφει.. Ἀμφιτρίτη 5.422
;οὐ γάρ σ' οὐδέ.. δαήμονι φωτὶ ἐΐσκω ἄθλων, οἷά τε πολλὰ μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλονται 8.160
, cf. 11.364, 14.63, 15.324, 379.6 in relative clauses indicating what is true of all persons or things denoted by the same word, οὐ γάρ τις νήσων ἱππήλατος οὐδ' εὐλείμων αἵ θ' ἁλὶ κεκλίαται no one of the islands which lie in the sea (as all islands do, i.e. no island at all), Od.4.608;ἡμίονον.. ἥ τ' ἀλγίστη δαμάσασθαι Il.23.655
;ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν γαμβρὸς ἢ πενθερός, οἵ τε μάλιστα κήδιστοι τελέθουσι Od.8.582
;αἰετοῦ οἴματ' ἔχων.. ὅς θ' ἅμα κάρτιστός τε καὶ ὤκιστος πετεηνῶν Il.21.252
, cf. 24.294;οὐδέ μιν εἰσοιχνεῦσι κυνηγέται, οἵ τε καθ' ὕλην ἄλγεα πάσχουσιν Od.9.120
;δικασπόλοι, οἵ τε θέμιστας πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται Il.1.238
, cf. Od.5.67, 101, Il.1.279, 19.31, 24.415;οἶνός σε τρώει.., ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους βλάπτει Od.21.293
, cf. 14.464;πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων Il.14.217
;οἰκωφελίη, ἥ τε τρέφει ἀγλαὰ τέκνα Od.14.223
.7 when the antecedent is a definite group of gods or men, the relative clause with τε indicates an essential characteristic of the antecedent,Ἐρινύες, αἵ θ' ὑπὸ γαῖαν ἀνθρώπους τείνυνται Il.19.259
;Σειρῆνας.., αἵ ῥά τε πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλγουσιν Od.12.39
;Φαίηκές μ' ἄγαγον ναυσίκλυτοι, οἵ τε καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πέμπουσιν 16.227
, cf. 20.187; ;Λωτοφάγων, οἵ τ' ἄνθινον εἶδαρ ἔδουσι Od.9.84
: similarly when the antecedent is an individual person (incl. god) or thing, the relative clause with τε indicates one of his or its general or essential characteristics or aspects, , cf. 2.669, Od.5.4;Ἑρμείαο ἕκητι διακτόρου, ὅς ῥά τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔργοισι χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζει 15.319
;Λάμπον καὶ Φαέθονθ', οἵ τ' Ἠῶ πῶλοι ἄγουσι 23.246
;Τειρεσίαο μάντιος ἀλαοῦ, τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσι 10.493
;τεύχεα δύνεις ἀνδρὸς ἀριστῆος, τόν τε τρομέουσι καὶ ἄλλοι Il.17.203
, cf. 7.112; κεῖται ἀνὴρ ὅν τ' (v.l. ὃν)ἶσον ἐτίομεν Ἕκτορι δίῳ, Αἰνείας 5.467
; the relative clause sts. indicates what is customary,οὐδέ σε λήθω τιμῆς ἧς τέ μ' ἔοικε τετιμῆσθαι μετ' Ἀχαιοῖς 23.649
;ἔνθα δ' ἀνὴρ ἐνίαυε πελώριος, ὅς ῥά τε μῆλα οἶος ποιμαίνεσκε Od.9.187
;τῶν πάντων οὐ τόσσον ὀδύρομαι.. ὡς ἑνός, ὅς τέ μοι ὕπνον ἀπεχθαίρει καὶ ἐδωδὴν μνωομένῳ 4.105
;σῆς ἀλόχου.. ἥ τέ τοι αὔτως ἧσται ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν 13.336
;καὶ κήρυκα Μέδοντα σαώσομεν, ὅς τέ μευ αἰεὶ.. κηδέσκετο 22.357
, cf. 346.8 τε is used in descriptions of particular places or things when attention is called to their peculiar or characteristic features, or their position, e.g.Λιβύην, ἵνα τ' ἄρνες ἄφαρ κεραοὶ τελέθουσι Od.4.85
; , cf. 9.124, 13.99, 100, 107, 109, 244; ἓξ δέ τέ οἱ (sc. Σκύλλῃ)δειραὶ περιμήκεες 12.90
, cf. 93,99, 105; ἐν δέ τε Γοργείη κεφαλή (in Athena's αἰγίς) Il.5.741; χαλεπὸν δέ τ' ὀρύσσειν ἀνδράσι γε θνητοῖσι (sc. μῶλυ) Od. 10.305; ; sts. τε draws attention to a well-known custom or permanent feature,ἀρξάμενοι τοῦ χώρου, ὅθεν τέ περ οἰνοχοεύει 21.142
;ἦ μένετε Τρῶας σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν, ἔνθα τε νῆες εἰρύατ' εὔπρυμνοι Il.4.247
, cf. Od. 6.266;ἐν ποταμῷ, ὅθι τ' ἀρδμὸς ἔην πάντεσσι βοτοῖσιν Il.18.521
, cf. Od.14.353.9 a part of the anatomy is defined by a clause (containing τε) which indicates a feature which universally belongs to it,κατ' ἰσχίον, ἔνθα τε μηρὸς ἰσχίῳ ἐνστρέφεται Il.5.305
, cf. 8.83, 13.547, 16.481, 20.478; similarly a point of time is defined,ὥρῃ ἐν εἰαρινῇ, ὅτε τ' ἤματα μακρὰ πέλονται Od.18.367
.10 τε is used in relative clauses which define a measurement of a particular thing or action by reference to the measurement (in general) of some thing or action well known in daily life,γεφύρωσεν δὲ κέλευθον μακρὴν ἠδ' εὐρεῖαν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ δουρὸς ἐρωὴ γίγνεται Il.15.358
; ; , cf. 3.321, al.; more rarely the definition is by reference to the measurement of a particular thing or action, ἤσθιε.. ἕως ὅ τ' ἀοιδὸς ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἄειδεν (s.v.l.) 17.358;ἥ τις δὴ τέτληκε τόσα φρεσίν, ὅσσα τ' ἐγώ περ 19.347
.11 the freq. use of τε B in similes is to be explained under one or other of the foregoing heads, e.g. when reference is made to generally known kinds of things or natural phenomena, to human experience in daily life, or to well-known phenomena of the animal world, Il.2.456, 459, 463, 468, 470, 471, 474, 481, 3.23-5,33, 11.415-7, al.; or when universal characteristics of gods, men, animals, etc., are indicated by relative clauses introduced by ὅς τε, ὅς ῥά τε, etc., 3.61, 151, 198, al.; or by ὥς τε, ἠΰτε, ὥς τίς τε, etc., e.g. 5.136, 17.133, Od.4.535,ὡς εἴ τε 9.314
, 14.254, etc.II in post-Hom. Gr. this use of τε is more restricted; outside of [dialect] Ep. and other early dactylic verse (Hes.Op.30, 214, 233, al., Xenoph.13.3, Thgn.148, 359, etc.) it is not found except with relatives, and with these it has scarcely any discernible sense, so that ὅς τε in Lyr. and Trag. is for the most part only = ὅς, e.g. (possibly generalizing)Μοῖρ', ἅ τε πατρώϊον τῶνδ' ἔχει τὸν εὔφρονα πότμον Pi.O.2.35
, cf. 14.2, A.Eu. 1024, E.Hec. 445 (lyr.), etc. (v. ὅστε); without generalizing force, Pi.N.9.9, A.Pers. 297, Ch. 615, etc.; Hdt. hasτά πέρ τε 1.74
,ὅκως τε 2.108
codd., ὅσον τε (without a verb, as in Od.9.325, al.) 1.126, 2.96, 3.5, al.,οἷά τε 1.93
codd. (adverbially 2.175, 5.11): in [dialect] Att. Prose and Com. even these uses disappear and we find only a few phrases, as ἅτε, ὥστε, ἐφ' ᾧτε, οἷός τε; in later Gr. we find exceptionallyἔνθεν τε Hp.Ep.17
; (ii B.C.);ἀπ' οὗ τε PCair.Zen.291.3
(iii B.C.); (Erythrae, ii B.C.); ἥ τ' PMag.Par.1.2962;ὅσον τε ὀκτὼ στάδια Paus.6.26.1
; καὶ ἔστιν ἔπη Μαντικὰ ὁπόσα τε (= which)ἐπελεξάμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς Id.9.31.5
;οἷόν τε καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κύων φωνῆς θεωροῦμεν S.E.M.11.28
.C in Hom. τε is also (but less freq.) used in conjunction with other particles in contexts (mainly particular statements) such as the following:1 in assurances, statements on oath, and threats,σχέτλιος, ἦ τ' ἐκέλευον ἀπωσάμενον δήϊον πῦρ ἂψ ἐπὶ νῆας ἴμεν Il.18.13
;ἐξ αὖ νῦν ἔφυγες θάνατον, κύον· ἦ τέ τοι ἄγχι ἦλθε κακόν 11.362
; ἦ τε is similarly used in 11.391, 17.171, 236, Od.24.28, 311, al.; ἦ τ' ἄν in Il.12.69, al.; γάρ τε (s. v.l.) inοὐ γάρ τ' οἶδα 6.367
, cf. Od.10.190; νύ τε in 1.60, 347 (but τ' more prob. = τοι, v. σύ) ; δέ τε inἀγορῇ δέ τ' ἀμείνονές εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοι Il.18.106
; ; μέν τε in , cf. 4.341; εἴ πέρ τε inοὔ τοι ἔτι δηρόν γε φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἴης ἔσσεται, οὐδ' εἴ πέρ τε σιδήρεα δέσματ' ἔχῃσιν Od.1.204
, cf. 188, Il.12.223, 245.2 also in commands, warnings, and admonitions,σίγα, μή τίς τ' ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν τοῦτον ἀκούσῃ μῦθον Il.14.90
, cf. Od.19.486; ; τούσδε τ' (v.l. δ')ἐᾶν 16.96
(nisi leg. τούσδ' ἔτ'); δὸς δέ τέ μ' ἄνδρα ἑλεῖν 5.118
; μηδέ τ' ἐρώει (nisi leg. μηδ' ἔτ') 2.179, 22.185.3 also in passionate utterances, in clauses which indicate the cause of the speaker's passion or a circumstance which might have caused others to behave more considerately towards him,ὤ μοι ἐγὼ δειλή.. ἥ τ'.. τὸν μὲν.. θρέψασα.. ἐπιπροέηκα Il.18.55
;σχέτλιοί ἐστε, θεοί, ζηλήμονες ἔξοχον ἄλλων, οἵ τε θεαῖς ἀγάασθε.. ἤν τίς τε.. Od.5.119
, 120, cf. 21.87, Il.15.468, 17.174; ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ μαχόμεσθ', οἵ πέρ τ' ἐπίκουροι ἔνειμεν and we, who ( mark you) are only allies (not γαμβροί and κασίγνητοι), are fighting, 5.477; τρεῖς γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφεοί for we, let me tell you, are three brothers, sons of Cronos (and Zeus has no prior title to power), 15.187;ποῖόν δε ἔπος φύγεν ἕρκος ὀδόντων δεινόν τ' ἀργαλέον τε· νεμεσσῶμαι δέ τ' ἀκούων Od.21.169
; .4 in descriptions of particular events and things where there is no general reference,κνίση μὲν ἀνήνοθεν, ἐν δέ τε φόρμιγξ ἠπύει Od.17.270
; ὥς (= so)τέ μοι ὑβρίζοντες ὑπερφιάλως δοκέουσιν δαίνυσθαι κατὰ δῶμα 1.227
;τοὺς μέν τ' ἰητροὶ πολυφάρμακοι ἀμφιπένονται.. σὺ δ' ἀμήχανος ἔπλευ, Ἀχιλλεῦ Il.16.28
; πόλιν πέρι δινηθήτην καρπαλίμοισι πόδεσσι, θεοὶ δέ τε πάντες ὁρῶντο dub. l. in 22.166;εὗρε δ' ἐνὶ σπῆϊ γλαφυρῷ Θέτιν, ἀμφὶ δέ τ' ἄλλαι εἵαθ' ὁμηγερέες ἅλιαι θεαί 24.83
(s.v.l.);ἐν δέ τε φάρμακον ἧκε Od.10.317
;νῶϊ δέ τ' ἄψορροι κίομεν Il.21.456
;πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ νύκτας.. ἄεσα καί τ' ἀνέμεινα.. Ἠῶ Od.19.342
;δέελον δ' ἐπὶ σῆμά τ' ἔθηκε Il.10.466
;ἐν δέ τε οἶνον κρητῆρσιν κερόωντο Od.20.252
; so with οὐδέ τ' (nisi leg. οὐδ' ἔτ'), τὸν καὶ ὑπέδδεισαν μάκαρες θεοὶ οὐδέ τ' ἔδησαν Il.1.406
;οὐδέ τ' ἔληγε μέγας θεός, ὦρτο δ' ἐπ' αὐτόν 21.248
;οὐδέ τ' ἄειρε 23.730
;οὐδέ τ' ἔασεν 11.437
, 21.596, cf. 15.709.5 ὅτε τε ( when) freq. introduces a temporal clause defining a point of time in the past by means of a well-known event which occurred then, ἦ οὐ μέμνῃ ὅτε τ' ἐκρέμω ὑψόθεν; Il.15.18;ὅτε τε Κρόνον.. Ζεὺς γαίης νέρθε καθεῖσε 14.203
; (but ἤματι τῷ ὅτε τε is general in 13.335; so also ὅτε πέρ τε.. κέρωνται in 4.259); , cf. 10.286, 22.102, Od.7.323, 18.257.6 in ὅ τε ( that or because) the τε has no observable meaning, , cf. 412, 4.32, 6.126, Od.5.357, al.7 ἐπεί τε = ἐπεί ( when) is rare in Hom.,ἐπεί τ' ἐνόησε Il.12.393
, cf. ἐπείτε.8 where τ' ἄρ occurs in questions, e.g. πῇ τ' ἂρ μέμονας καταδῦναι ὅμιλον; Il.13.307, cf. 1.8, 18.188, al., ταρ (q.v.) should prob. be read, since ἄρ ([etym.] α) usu. precedes a τε which is not copulative; so perh. ταρα should be read for τ' ἄρα in Od.1.346.9 inἣ θέμις ἐστὶν.. ἤ τ' ἀνδρῶν ἤ τε γυναικῶν Il.9.276
, it is not clear whether τε is copulative (τε A) or generalizing (τε B) or neither (τε C); ἤ is prob. = ἦ (accented as in ἤτοι (; ἤ τ' ἀλκῆς ἤ τε φόβοιο is dub. l. in 17.42; ἤ τ' = or is found in 19.148, = than in Od.16.216.10 Rarer and later uses;a also, esp. withἄλλος, Ἑρμεία, σὺ γὰρ αὖτε τά τ' ἄλλα περ ἄγγελός ἐσσι Od.5.29
, cf. 17.273, Il.23.483;ἐπεὶ τά τε ἄλλα πράττουσιν καλῶς, ἀναθεῖναι αὐτοὺς καὶ στήλην IG22.1298.9
, cf. Lycurg.100 (s.v.l.);ἐκομισάμην τὸ παρὰ σοῦ ἐπιστόλιον, ἐν ᾧ ὑπέγραψάς μοι τήν τε παρὰ Ζήνωνος πρὸς Ἰεδδοῦν γεγραμμένην PCair.Zen.18.1
(iii B.C.); εἰ οὖν περὶ τούτων ἐπιστροφὴν μὴ ποιήσει, οἵ τε λοιποί μοι τὰς χεῖρας προσοίσουσιν (- σωσιν Pap.) PPetr.2p.10 (iii B.C.);τῶν δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ποιησόντων τά τε κτήνη ὑπὸ στέρεσιν ἀχθήσεσθαι πρὸς τὰ ἐκφόρια PTeb.27.74
(ii B.C.); v. supr. A. 11.3b.b with ὅδε, adding a slight emphasis to the preceding word,εἰ δὴ τήνδε τε γαῖαν ἀνείρεαι Od.13.238
, cf. 15.484.c τε γάρ rarely = καὶ γάρ or γάρ, Arist.APo. 75b41, de An. 405a4, PA 661b28, Pol. 1318b33, 1333a2; ἐάν τε γάρ for even if, 2 Ep.Cor.10.8; τήν τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐκ ᾔδειν for I had not known even lust. Ep.Rom.7.7.D Position of τε:1 in signf. A, as an enclitic, it stands second word in the sentence, clause, or phrase, regardless of the meaning: ἐγγύθι τε Πριάμοιο καὶ Ἕκτορος near both Priam and Hector, Il.6.317; , cf. 4.505, 7.295; codd., cf. 291 (anap.);ἄνευ τε δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης Hdt.1.69
;ὑπέρ τε σοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς PEnteux.6.6
(iii B.C.); , cf. Ti. 70b; hence in E.Or. 897 πόλεος must be taken with what precedes (Porson ad loc.): but article + noun, preposition + noun are freq. regarded as forming a unity indivisible by τε, τοῖς κτανοῦσί τε A.Ch.41
(lyr.);πρὸς βίαν τε Id.Pr. 210
; also the order is freq. determined by the meaning, τε being placed immediately after the word (or first word of a phrase or clause) which it joins to what precedes or to what follows,πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε Il.1.544
;ἔξω δόμων τε καὶ πάτρας A.Pr. 665
; the copulative or preparatory τε precedes many other particles, e.g. τε γάρ, τ' ἄρα, τέ τις.2 τε is enclitic in signfs. B, C also, and stands early in its sentence, clause, or phrase (v. supr.), but many particles which follow τε in signf. A precede it in signfs. B, C, e.g. in signfs. B, C we have δέ τε, μέν τε, γάρ τε, ἀλλά τε, δ' ἄρα τε, ὅς ῥά τε, οὔτ' ἄρ τε, καὶ γάρ τίς τε, ὅς τίς τε, καί τε. -
8 διότι
διότι conj. (Hdt.+) (B-D-F §294, 4; 456, 1; Rob. ind.; Meisterhans3-Schw. 252f; Mayser 161; Thackeray 138f; FKälker, Quaest. de Eloc. Polyb. 1880, 243f; 300) a marker used to establish an intimate connection between two statements.① marker of a causal connection between two statements, because (=διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι ‘for the reason that, in view of the fact that’) in causal clauses Lk 2:7; 21:28; Ac 17:31 v.l.; Ro 8:21 v.l. (but s. 4); 1 Cor 15:9; Phil 2:26; 1 Th 2:8; 4:6; Hb 11:5 (Gen 5:24), 23; Js 4:3; Dg 6:5; Hv 3, 5, 4; m 12, 3, 4; Hs 9, 14, 4.② marker used to introduce an inference, therefore (=διὰ τοῦτο) Ac 13:35; 20:26.③ marker used to indicate why someth. just stated can reasonably be considered valid, used in place of ὅτι (TestAbr A 11 p. 90, 6 [Stone p. 28]; TestJob 49:3): for Lk 1:13; Ac 10:20 v.l.; 18:10; 22:18; Ro 1:19–21; 3:20; 8:7; Gal 2:16 v.l.; 1 Th 2:18; 1 Pt 1:16ab (v.l.), 24 (ὅτι P72); 2:6.④ marker of discourse content, that (Teles p. 46, 4; 47, 12; 48, 11; Antig. Car. 149; 152; Diod S 4, 10, 7; 4, 23, 2 al.; Epict. 4, 7, 8; Dio Chrys. 21 [38], 14; Celsus 2, 49; SIG 1169, 24f; Sb 7638, 8 [257 B.C.]; UPZ 15, 24 [156 B.C.] ἐπίγνωσιν διότι=ὅτι; UPZ 16, 15 in a parallel concept of the same petition]; EpArist 151; Jos., Bell. 3, 475, Ant. 15, 142) Ro 8:21 v.l. (s. 1 above).—M-M. -
9 Thinking
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)[E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking
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